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ARTICLE
MARRIAGE AND INEVITABILITY:
A LESSON FROM MARYLAND
By: William C. Duncan*
"'Mr. Kenge, ' said Allan, appearing enlightened all in a moment.
'Excuse me, our time presses. Do I understand that the whole estate is
found to have been absorbed in costs?' 'Hem! I believe so, 'returned
Mr. Kenge."\
I.

INTRODUCTION

A

s the ongoing litigation over the meaning of marriage drags into
its fourth decade, the legal dispute is beginning to rival Charles
Dickens' fictional case Jarndyce and Jarndyce in longevity.2 Like
that chancery case, it too has raised high expectations of a favorable
outcome that will vindicate the hopes of its proposed beneficiaries.
At the present time, the focus of the ongoing debate over the
definition of marriage is centered on California, where a major federal
case tests the constitutionality of the state's marriage law. 3 Maryland
was once the site of a similar courtroom battle, though on a smaller
scale. 4 That battle, however, deserves more attention as it, along with
similar decisions from other states, will likely prove in the future to be
more influential both within and beyond the state than currently
imagined.
This article will carefully examine the Maryland case in the context
of four decades of litigation over the definition of marriage. It will
utilize a close reading of the trial court and Court of Appeals of
Maryland decisions to elucidate important questions about marriage
and the law.
II.

CONTEXT FOR CONAWAY V. DEANE5

Maryland's seminal same-sex marriage case was decided in 2007,
but was only a skirmish in a much larger battle taking place in courts,
*
1
2
3
4

5

William C. Duncan is the Director of the Marriage Law Foundation.
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 835 (Heritage Press 1942)(1853).
Id. at 18-19.
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F .3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011).
Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 932 A.2d 571 (2007).
Id.
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in legislatures, and at the ballot box over a period now stretching forty
years.6
In the wake of Loving v. Virginia, 7 a same-sex couple in Minnesota
sought a marriage license from their local clerk hoping that the right to
marry discussed in Loving would be extended to include a right to an
entirely novel definition of marriage. 8 The lawsuit that ensued was
appealed to the Minnesota and United States Supreme Courts, with the
former rejecting all of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims 9 and the
latter dismissing "for want of a substantial federal question,,,IO which
is a decision on the merits. II For the next two decades, there were
only sporadic attempts to establish legal recognition of same-sex
marriages through litigation. 12
Not until the 1990s did a lawsuit alleging that state marriage laws
were unconstitutional for failure to allow same-sex couples to get
marriage licenses seem likely to succeed. In 1993, the Hawaii
Supreme Court narrowly ruled that the state's marriage law was
presumptively unconstitutional, though the court also remanded to
allow the state to demonstrate a compelling interest justifying the
current law. 13 This decision, along with a similar trial court ruling in
Alaska,14 was preempted by an amendment to the state constitution. IS
Ten years later, litigants finally secured a victory in Massachusetts,
where the supreme judicial court ruled the state's marriage definition
lacked even a rational basis. 16 At around the same time, the United
States Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute prohibiting
sodomy. 17
The conjunction of these rulings suggested to some that the time
was right for a major effort to secure same-sex marriage through
6
See William C. Duncan, The Litigation to Redefine Marriage: Equality and Social
Meaning, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 623 (2004) (discussing the history of same-sex marriage

litigation from 1971 to 2003).
7
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
8 Bakerv. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
9 ld.
10
Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
11
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
12
See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111
(1982); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973); DeSanto v. Bamsley, 476 A.2d
952,952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974),
denying cert. to, No. 43391, 1974 WL 45234 (Wash. Oct. 10,1974).
13 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,67-68 (Haw. 1993).
14
Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
15
HAw. CONST. art. I, § 23; see also ALASKA CONST. art. J, § 25.
16 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
17
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,562,566 (2003).
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strategic litigation throughout the United States. Advocates of
redefinition believe that same-sex marriage is inevitable and that it is
time for many more states to embrace the future of marriage. Thus,
litigation began in a series of states chosen for their likelihood of
accepting claims for same-sex marriage. It has long been a tactic of
same-sex marriage advocates to litigate in states based on "the
political climate in the state" and "perhaps most important, the
composition of the state judiciary.,,18 As one legal activist noted,
"'[t]he lawsuits we have done that have succeeded have been carefully
planned and brought in states where we already had the legal building
blocks by doing work on other issues.",19 Another legal activist
explained that "the lawsuits are focused on states where public
attitudes toward same-sex unions seem particularly friendly and where
amending the state constitution to counter any ruling for same-sex
marriage would be difficult. ,,20
Maryland was among the states chosen through this forum
shopping process for litigation in the post-Goodridge wave. 21 Suits
were also filed in New York,22 Washington,23 Connecticut24 and
Iowa. 25 Also in the wake of the Massachusetts decision, the mayor of
San Francisco began offering marriage licenses to same-sex couples,
precipitating a lawsuit to clarify his authority to determine the state's
marriage law?6 This, in turn, led to a lawsuit regarding whether the
state's marriage definition, enacted by voter initiative in 2000, violated
California's constitution. 27
For those who believed the time had come for same-sex marriage,
the results were mixed. Over the next few years, the high courts of
California, Connecticut, and Iowa all ruled that marriage redefinition
was mandated by their state constitutions. 28 In contrast, the high
18
Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay
Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567,611 n.194
(1994).
19
Wyatt Buchanan, Profound Issues in Seattle Lawsuit; State high court set to rule on
gay rights, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 3, 2006, at Al (quoting Jennifer Pizer).
20
Joan Biskupic, Wave of Lawsuits Targets Bans on Same-Sex Marriage, Challenges
argue some states' constitutions include right to gay and lesbian nuptials, USA TODAY, Mar.
24, 2006, at 4A.
21
See Conaway, 401 Md. 219, 932 A.2d 571 (addressing a challenge to the denial of
marriage licenses to certain same-sex couples).
22
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
23
Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 968 (Wash. 2006).
24
Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 411 (Conn. 2008).
2S
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009).
26
Lockyer v. City and Cnty. ofS.F., 95 P.3d 459,462 (Cal. 2004).
27 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,397 (Cal. 2008).
28 Id. at 400-02; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 412; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 872.
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courts of Maryland, New York, and Washington ruled that defining
marriage solely as the union of a husband and wife was consistent with
their state constitutions. 29 Interestingly, in each state where the court
has ruled that marriage laws are unconstitutional, the state attorney
general either decided not to participate in defending the state's
marriage law, as was the case in Iowa, or to only raise pro forma
arguments and even disavow the kinds of arrments accepted in the
states where courts upheld the marriage laws. 3
The continued intransigence of citizens to accept the new marital
regime has further complicated the preferred narrative of the everincreasing acceptance of same-sex marriage. As previously noted, the
people of Hawaii and Alaska approved amendments to their
constitutions and either reserved to the legislature the definition of
marriage (Hawaii) or preserved the impugned definition of marriage
(Alaska) after adverse decisions by courts in those states.
Subsequently, twenty-eight additional states amended their
constitutions to define marriage. 3l
Prominent among these is
California. After the California Supreme Court ordered a redefinition
of marriage, citizen groups quickly proposed Proposition 8, an
amendment to the state constitution approved by voters in November
2008. 32 In November 2010, all three members of the Iowa Supreme
Court who had joined the opinion ruling Iowa's marriage law
unconstitutional, who were also on the ballot for retention, were voted
out of office-an extremely unusual development. 33
29
Conaway, 401 Md. at 325, 903 A.2d at 635; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 12; Andersen,
138 P.3d at 1010.
30
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 450; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 523-24 n.15; Varnum,
763 N.W.2d at 869.
31
ALA. CON ST. art. I, § 36.03; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX, § 1; ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1;
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27; GA. CONST. art I,
§ 4, para. I; IDAHO CONST. art. Ill, § 28; KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16; Ky. CONST. § 233A; LA.
CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. ch.l, art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A; Mo.
CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 7; NEB. CON ST. art. I, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, §
21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § II; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; OR.
CONST. Art. XV, § 5a; S.c. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; S.D. CONST. XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art.
XI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH CON ST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; WIS.
CONST. art. XIII, § 13. After the Maine Legislature passed a bill defining marriage as the
union of any two people, voters rejected the law in a November 2009 referendum. Abby
Goodnough, A Setback in Maine for Gay Marriage, but Medical Marijuana Law Expands,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.comJ20091ll/05/us/politics/
05maine.html? r=3.
32
CAL. CaNST. art. I, § 7.5. As noted above, this amendment has been challenged in
federal court. See generally supra note 3, at 927.
33
See Krissah Thompson, Gay Marriage Fight Targeted Judges, Politicizing Rulings on
Issue, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com!wpdyn/contentlarticlel20 I 01ll/031AR20 10 110307058.html.
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MARYLAND: INTERRUPTING INEVITABILITY

The context surrounding the Maryland marriage decision illustrates
some important tensions in the ongoing marriage debate.
First is the gap between the claim of inevitability and reality. The
proponents of same-sex marriage explain their efforts in terms of
inevitability-that Americans are belatedly becoming enlightened and
accept the reality that "marriage equality" is an unavoidable feature of
the family law of the future. This follows from the idea that
redefinition is a fundamental right. If something is a fundamental
right that right must be respected and, indeed will be, even if it may
take time for full acceptance. The inevitability argument for same-sex
marriage is premised on this precise belief.
The inevitability theme, however, is just inconsistent with recent
experience. There is strong evidence that same-sex marriage is
anything but inevitable, as we've seen in the Maryland case.
The second tension springs from the nature of the inevitability
argument and, particularly, from its presuppositions as to rights. The
inevitability narrative stigmatizes opponents of the marriage change by
positing that people who oppose the "fundamental right" of same-sex
marriage are bigots or discriminators, akin to those who believe that
one race is superior to another. Shifting the focus of marriage to the
straw man of individual rights shuts down discussion of the potential
consequences and ramifications of the change in marriage.
Thus, interrupting the inevitability theme may allow for an open
evaluation of the consequences and a discussion of the risks and tradeoffs inherent in the redefinition of marriage to include same-sex
couples. To the degree such a theme is accepted, however, this type of
analysis is unlikely ever to occur, with ramifications and consequences
only becoming clear later when retrenching is much more difficult.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision in Conaway v.
Deane, like similar decisions in Washington and New York and along
with the explosion of state marriage amendments, makes two things
clear. First, same-sex marriage is not an inevitable development as an
empirical matter. In other words, the idea that redefining marriage is a
foregone conclusion because it is so clearly a constitutional right is
inconsistent with reality.
This first point is somewhat obvious. Where the majority of
appellate decisions assessing the question have ruled that marriage
laws defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman are
constitutional and where the overwhelming majority of states have
either amended their constitutions to protect this understanding of
marriage, seen their citizens vote to reject same-sex marriage, or have
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either statutes or court decisions defining marriage as the union of a
man and woman, same-sex marriage is hardly inevitable. Similarly,
the Maryland decision in Conaway v. Deane is evidence of that fact.
Second, a careful analysis of the claims for and against redefining
marriage, elucidated by the Circuit Court and Court of Appeals
decisions in Conaway v. Deane, illustrates the risks inherent in
accepting the idea that redefinition is akin to a foregone conclusion
just waiting for enshrinement in the law. As already noted, claiming
that an assertion is actually a fundamental right creates a risk that
discussion will end and, thus, that important social interests will be
slighted by courts and legislators swayed by the inevitability
argument.
To understand this second point, that failing to examine the logic of
redefinition will have consequences, requires a close analysis of the
competing court decisions. The contrast between the competing
decisions illuminates what is lost when claims for redefinition as an
inevitable triumph of human rights are accepted.
In Deane v. Conaway, nine same-sex couples and one individual
who desired the right to marry another man, sued county clerks from
various parts of Maryland who had denied marriage licenses to the
couples after they had applied. 34 The couples claimed to be
"representative" of other such couples in Maryland who have suffered
"legal, financial, and emotional harm as a result of the same-sex
prohibition" implicit in the state's definition of marriage. 35 They
claimed that they would have received licenses "but for their sexual
identities.,,36
The couples asserted four claims in their challenge to Maryland's
marriage laws: that the law discriminated on the basis of gender in
violation of the state's Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"), that the
law discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, and that the law
violated their fundamental right to marry under both the equal
protection and due process provisions ofthe state constitution. 37
The Circuit Court focused its analysis on the first claim. 38 The
court began by holding that the marriage law constituted facial sex

34
Deane v. Conaway, No. 24-C-04-005390, 2006 WL 148145, at *1-2 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan.
20,2006).
35
Id. at *l.
36 Id.
37 Id. at *3.
38
See generally id. at *3-9 (demonstrating how the majority of the opinion was spent
discussing this particular argument).
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discrimination. 39 In the court's description, "[t]he relative genders of
the two individuals are facts that lie at the very center of the matter;
those whose genders are the same as their intended spouses may not
marry, but those whose genders are different from their intended
spouse may.,,40 Thus, to the court, "the relative genders of a same-sex
couple are the very crux of the matter.,,4! Accordingly, since a woman
could marry a male partner and a man could not "marry that same
male partner" (assuming this does not involve polygamy), "compared
to the woman, the man is disadvantaged solely because of his sex.'.42
The court posits an analogy it finds "striking" to an earlier Maryland
case in which a Maryland court transferred custody of daughters from
the father to the mother because it believed the mother would better
parent the daughters. 43
Having decided the Maryland marriage law constituted sex
discrimination, the trial court explained that strict scrutiny analysis
was appropriate under the state ERA. 44 This conclusion was
superfluous, however, because the court could find:
no apparent compelling state interest in a statutory prohibition
of same-sex marriage discriminating, on the basis of sex,
against those individuals whose gender is identical to their
intended spouses. Indeed, this Court is unable to even find that
the prohibition of same-sex marriage rationally relates to a
..
.
45
Ieglt1mate state mterest.
The clerks argued that, in the court's characterization, "promoting
the traditional family unit, in which the heterosexual parents are
married, and encouraging procreation and child-rearing within this
traditional unit,,46 was a legitimate state interest served by the marriage
law, and the plaintiffs "do not contend that these are not legitimate
Id. at *3.
Deane, 2006 WL 148145, at *3.
41
Id. at *4.
42
Id. at *5. This line of reasoning is potentially limitless. For instance, could not one
claim that the law limiting each person to one spouse constituted marital status
discrimination? Following the court's logic, "but for" being married one would be free to
marry another person. Thus, if one is single, one could marry, but if one is married, one could
not. Again, following the court's logic, the only thing separating a person seeking
polyamorous marriage and a single person who can marry is marital status and, hence,
discrimination. The same could be said of age or relationship as well-all of which is to say
that the court's logic is more circular than illuminating.
43
Id. at *6 (citing Griffin v. Crane, 351 Md. 133, 716 A.2d 1029 (1998».
44
Deane, 2006 WL 148145, at *6.
45
!d. at *7.
46 !d.
39

40
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state interests.,,47 The court, however, said there was "no rational
connection between the prevention of same-sex marriages and an
increase or decrease in the number of heterosexual marriages or of
children born to those unions.,,48 The court says the law is based on
overly broad assumptions about "the optimal environment for
procreation" and that "the Legislature has little experience with samesex marriage,,49 so its grocreational purpose cannot be linked to the
definition of marriage. The court also claims that if the legislature
were to justify its marriage law it "would have to have concluded that
children raised by opposite-sex married couples are better-off than
children raised by same-sex married couples,,51 and to do so "may
have assumed that opposite-sex marriages less frequently end in
divorce, that opposite-sex couples are better parents, or that oppositesex couples focus more on their children's education.,,52 The court
says that these assumptions "are broad unsupported generalizations"
and, thus, cannot justify the marriage law. 53
The court then summarily disposes of the clerks' claim that the
marriage law is justified by the need to keep Maryland law uniform
with the law of other states and of the United States. 54 It argues that
giving the benefits of marriage, but not the status, to same-sex couples
would not be an appropriate solution to the problem identified by the
court. 55 Doing so would simply demonstrate the irrationality of the
distinction since, if statutes "make a married couple and a non-married
couple essentially equivalent with respect to the effects of marriage,
ld.
ld.
49 ld. It is very difficult to understand what the court means by this. It seems to be
suggesting that if the Legislature knew more about same-sex marriage it would come to a
different conclusion. But on what authority can the court possibly make such a claim? If this
is what the court means, then any novel legal claim would have to be accepted since the
Legislature would always be lacking in experience with the change and could thus not
rationally arrive at reasons for preventing it. A more troubling possibility is that the court is
suggesting that only it is equipped to know the implications of redefining marriage without
experience, unlike the legislature that needs specific experience to comprehend them. The
court then follows this interesting assertion by noting that under the rational basis test, the
legislature can justifY its -actions by "rational speculation" and "does not need evidentiary
support." ld. at *8. This statement, of course, directly contradicts the assertion regarding
evidence.
50
Deane, 2006 WL 148145, at *7.
51
ld. at *8.
52 ld. It is of course, highly ironic that the court fmds fault with the legislature for
engaging in broad generalizations when it is basing its conclusion on assumptions of what the
legislature might have assumed.
53
ld.
54 ld.
55
Deane, 2006 WL 148145, at *9.
47

48
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there simply is no rational reason to prevent the marriage.,,56 The
court ends by rejecting a claim that, in the court's words, the marriage
law is justified by an interest in "promoting and preserving
legislatively expressed societal values" because, to the court, "tradition
and social values alone cannot support adequately a discriminatory
statutory classification. ,,57
The Court of Appeals took the case directll without waiting for an
appeal through the Court of Special Appeals. 5 The majority began its
legal analysis by directly addressing the sex discrimination claim. 59
The court noted that Maryland sex discrimination precedent "involved
legislative classifications that gave certain rights to an entire class of
men or women, to the exclusion of the opposite sex" thus making
these cases distinguishable from Maryland's marriage law "that, on its
face, applies equally to the members of both sexes.,,60 The court
examined in considerable detail the legislative history of the state and
proposed
federal
Equal
Rights
Amendment,
including
contemporaneous arguments offered in support of ratification in
Maryland. 61 The court concluded that "the primary purpose of the
ERA was to eliminate discrimination as between men and woman as a
class.,,62 The court previously had occasion to apply the ERA in other
cases and noted that "our applications of the ERA indicate that its
primary purpose was to remedy the long history of subordination of
women in this country, and to place men and women on equal ground
as pertains to the enjoyment of basic legal rights under the law.,,63
Having examined both sources of interpretation, the court concluded
"the Legislature's and electorate's ultimate goal in putting in place the
Maryland ERA was to put men and women on equal ground, and to
subject to closer scrutiny any governmental action which sin,rled out
for disparate treatment men or women as discrete classes.,,6 Thus,
unless a challenged statute "grants, either on its face or in application,
rights to men or women as a class, to the exclusion of an entire
subsection of similarly situated members of the opposite sex, the
provisions of the ERA are not implicated and the statutory
classification under review is subjected to rational basis scrutiny,
56
57
58
59

60
61

62

63
64

Id.
Id.
Conaway, 401 Md. at 238,932 A.2d at 581.
Id. at 244, 932 A.2d at 585.
Id. at 246, 932 A.2d at 586 n.14.
Id. at 246-72, 932 A.2d at 587-603.
Id. at 250, 932 A.2d at 589.
Id. at 254, 932 A.2d at 591.
Conaway, 401 Md. at 260,932 A.2d at 596.
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unless there exists some other reason to apply heightened scrutiny. ,,65
Applied to the state's marriage law, the court found it did:
not separate men and women into discrete classes for the
purpose of granting to one class of persons benefits at the
expense of the other class. Nor does the statute, facially or in
its application, place men and women on an uneven playing
field. Rather, the statute prohibits equally both men and
women from the same conduct. 66
The court specifically rejected the trial court's assignment of
almost totemic significance to the mere mention of sex in the law: "a
statute does not become unconstitutional simply because, in some
manner, it makes reference to race or sex.,,67
The court also rejected the analogy to Loving v. Virginia as
"inapt.,,68 The court noted that the United States Supreme Court in
Loving "determined that, although the statute applied on its face
equally to all races, the underlying purpose was to sustain White
Supremacy and to subordinate African-Americans and other nonCaucasians as a class.,,69 So, for the court, "[a]bsent some showing
that [the marriage law] was 'designed to subordinate either men to
women or women to men as a class,' . . . we find the analogy to
Loving inapposite.,,7o
Having disposed of the sex discrimination claim, the court turned to
the claim of sexual orientation discrimination. The court said the
marriage law "does differentiate implicitly on the basis of sexual
preference" but that such a category "is neither a suspect nor quasisuspect class" subject to rational basis review. 7l The court admitted
that:
[h]omosexual persons have been the object of societal
prejudice by private actors as well as by the judicial and
legislative branches of federal and state governments. Gay,
lesbian, and bisexual persons likewise have been subject to
unique disabilities not truly indicative of their abilities to
contribute meaningfully to society. 72
65
66
67

68
69

70
71
72

Jd. at 263-64,932 A.2d at 597-98.
Jd. at 264, 932 A.2d at 598.
Id. at 268-69, 932 A.2d at 600.
Jd. at 268, 932 A.2d at 600.
Id. at 269, 932 A.2d at 60 I.
Conaway, 401 Md. at 270,932 A.2d at 601 (quoting Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11).
Jd. at 277,932 A.2d at 605-06.
Id. at 282,932 A.2d at 609.
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The court held, however, that "we are not persuaded that gay, lesbian,
and bisexual persons are so politically powerless that they are entitled
to 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. ",73
The court noted that "at least in Maryland, advocacy to eliminate
discrimination against gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons based on
their sexual orientation has met with growing successes in the
legislative and executive branches of government," referencing antidiscrimination provisions in state code and regulations that include
sexual orientation. 74 The court also said that given "the scientific and
sociological evidence currently available to the public, we are unable
to take judicial notice that gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons display
readily-recognizable, immutable characteristics that define the group
such that they may be deemed a suspect class.,,75 Further, the court
noted that the plaintiffs "point neither to scientific nor sociological
studies, which have withstood analysis for evidentiary admissibility, in
support of an argument that sexual orientation is an immutable
characteristic." 76
In its analysis of the argument that same-sex marriage was a
fundamental right, the court said it could not rest on a "brief
invocation of the cases outlining the importance of marriage generally
and the other liberty interests that make up the fundamental rights
panorama of personal autonomy.,,77 Instead, the court agreed with
other appellate courts "that the issue is framed more properly in terms
of whether the right to choose same-sex marriage is fundamental.,,78
The court noted that the right-to-marry cases "infer that the right to
marry enjoys its fundamental status due to the male-female nature of
the relationshir and/or the attendant link to fostering procreation of
our species.,,7 Specifically, "virtually every Supreme Court case
recognizing as fundamental the right to marry indicates as the basis for
the conclusion the institution's inextricable link to procreation, which
necessarily and biologically involves participation (in ways either
intimate or remote) by a man and a woman.,,80 The court accepted that
"this latitudinously-stated right to marry" is fundamental, but the court
noted that marriage "is nevertheless a public institution that
73
74
75
76

77
78

79
80

ld. at 286, 932 A.2d at 611 (internal citation omitted).
ld., 932 A.2d at 611.
ld. at 291, 932 A.2d at 614.
Conaway, 401 Md. 292, 932 A.2d 615.
ld. at 297-98,932 A.2d at 618.
ld. at 299, 932 A.2d at 619.
ld. at 299-300, 932 A.2d at 619.
ld. at 302, 932 A.2d at 621.
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historically has been subject to the regulation and police powers of the
State.,,81 Thus, "the fundamental right to marry is not absolute" with
regulations related to age, relationship, and competency, and there is
no precedent for a fundamental right to marry the person of one's
choice despite that person being "lineally and directly related.,,82 The
court concluded that a right to same-sex marriage is not "so deeply
imbedded in the history, tradition, and culture of this State and Nation
that it should be deemed fundamental.,,83 Examining "the current
economic, political, and social climate" the court said it was
"unwilling to hold that a right to same-sex marriage has taken hold to
the point that it is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or deeply
rooted in the history and tradition of Maryland. ,,84 In support, the
court noted that "Congress, as well as nearly every state in the Nation,
has taken legislative action or otherwise enacted constitutional
amendments limiting explicitly the institution of marriage to those
unions between a man and a woman.,,85
The court finally addressed the state's justification for its marriage
law. 86 The court agreed "that the State's asserted interest in fostering
More
procreation is a legitimate governmental interest.,,87
specifically, "[i]n light of the fundamental nature of procreation, and
the importance placed on it by the Supreme Court, safeguarding an
environment most conducive to the stable propagation and
continuance of the human race is a legitimate government interest.,,88
To the court, the "'inextricable link' between marriage and procreation
reasonably could support the definition of marriage as between a man
and a woman only, because it is that relationship that is capable of
producing biological offspring of both members (advances in
reproductive technologies notwithstanding). ,,89 In response to the
argument that the state could have no interest in linking marriage and
procreation since some married couples do not have children and some
who have children do not marry, the court explained that to comport
with rational basis, a law "need not be drawn with mathematical
exactitude, and may contain imperfections that result in some degree
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Id. at 303-04, 932 A.2d at 622.
Conaway, 401 Md. 305-06, 932 A.2d 623.
Id. at 307, 932 A.2d at 624.
Id. at 308, 312, 932 A.2d at 625, 627.
Id. at 312, 932 A.2d at 627.
Id. at 315-24, 932 A.2d at 629-34.
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of inequality. ,,90 Additionally, "inquiry into the ability or willingness
of a couple actually to bear a child during marriage would violate the
fundamental right to marital privacy.,,91 The court concluded that:
the fundamental right to marriage and its ensuing benefits are
conferred on opposite-sex couples not because of a distinction
between whether various opposite-sex couples actually
procreate, but rather because of the possibility of procreation.
In such a situation, so long as the Legislature has not acted
wholly unreasonably in granting recognition to the only
relationship capable of bearing children traditionally within the
marital unit [the courts are not to substitute their own judgment
for the legislature's].92
Therefore, the Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected the
constitutional claims and upheld Maryland's position on marriage law.
Three judges dissented from the majority opinion. 93 One did so
only partially, arguing that while the status of marriage could be
withheld from same-sex couples, the state ought to extend the benefits
of marriage to them. 94 The other two would have accepted the
absolutist take on sex discrimination. 95
IV.

THE FUTURE OF INEVITABILITY

The decision of the Circuit Court in Deane v. Conaway can serve as
a proxy for the inevitability argument because it employs all of the
presumptions of that argument as to the constitutional mandate for
marriage redefinition. By contrast, the Court of Appeals decision in
Conaway v. Deane exposes the problems with the argument.
Briefly, the problems inherent in the inevitability argument are that
it distorts reality and elides the very real consequences of the change it
claims is unavoidable. These problems are linked to one another.
In his important work of political science, Eric Voegelin described
the tendency of ideologists in our time to merge the realm of an ideal
utopian world with the reality of lived experience:

90
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Id. at 321-22, 932 A.2d at 633.
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Conaway, 401 Md. 326,932 A.2d 636 (Raker, J., concurring and dissenting).
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at 693 (Bell, c.J., dissenting).
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[i]n the Gnostic dream world ... nonrecognition of reality is
the fIrst principle. As a consequence, types of action which in
the real world would be considered morally insane because of
the real effects which they have will be considered moral in the
dream world because they intended an entirely different effect.
The gap between intended and real effect will be imputed not
to the Gnostic immorality of ignoring the structure of reality
but to the immorality of some other person or society that does
not behave as it should behave according to the dream
conception of cause and effect. 96
Edmund Burke, too, was aware of this dangerous tendency and
"regarded speculative ideology as a form of metaphysical insanity
which totally disregarded historical experience and the depravity in
human nature regarding the uses of political power.,,97
The chief threats of "speculative ideology," or the new Gnosticism,
thus derive from their need to ignore or distort reality to advance an
invented notion of the ideal. If reality, as lived, is admitted, it will
frustrate the ideological goal because those realities will make clear
the goal is not achievable. If the goal is, as it so often seems to be,
uniformitarian equality, factors that militate against the achievement
of this goal, such as differences in capacity, must be ignored or
repressed. Because the ideological goal is paramount, the risks
inherent in the effort to enforce it are minimized or denied. These
risks will include the loss of goods related to human diversity, various
unintended consequences of change, and enforcement costs that may
easily become increasingly steep and which will be felt as increasingly
punitive. Having established an ideological goal, the temptation to
pursue it "by any means necessary" is almost irresistible.
As to this latter point, Richard Weaver has noted that the "fIrst
step" for ideologists "is to confuse and paralyze the opposition by
sowing widely and ostensibly" the notion that the ideological account
of reality is the only possible account and that its eventual triumph is
inevitable. 98 Dr. Weaver continues: "[o]nce you have convinced a
man that he cannot operate on any representation of reality but your
96
ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 169-70 (The
University of Chicago Press 1952).
97
Peter J. Stanlis, Edmund Burke's Legal Erudition and Practical Politics: Ireland and
the American Revolution, 35 POL. SCI. REVIEWER 66, 70 (2006).
98
Richard M. Weaver, On Setting the Clock Right, NATIONAL REVIEW, Oct. 12, 1957,
available
at
http://www.nationalreview.comlnroriginalsl?q=
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own, you have him in a state of virtual impotence. ,,99 The challenge is
that inevitability so rarely proves to be inevitable. "The second step is
to regard this as nonsense as far as your own affairs go and to proceed
to fashion the world according to your preferred concept of it. ,,100 So
that rather than merely being a statement of historical law for the
ideologically motivated, the claim of inevitability "is an expression of
their will to power and their determination to overcome everything
which stands in the way of the actualization of their dream."lol
These observations have real application to the debate over
marriage redefinition. The proposal that marriage must be redefined is
the manifestation of an egalitarian ideolo~ical goal, frankly labeled by
its proponents as "marriage equality.,,1 2 It makes short shrift of
opposing realities such as sex difference, procreation, specifically that
it requires one person of either sex, tradition and history, and the
channeling function of family law whereby legal understandings
influence actual behavior. The marriage equality principle is widely
proclaimed to be inevitable, such that opponents are accused of being
on the wrong side of history. 103 Any concerns about the effect of the
change are dismissed as naIve or invidious.
As with other claims of historical determinism, the inevitability of
marriage equality is not so inevitable that it can be trusted to happen in
its own time. Rather, activists feel the need to give the inevitable a
shove forward and will do so heedless of normal restraints. The
pursuit of the goal of marriage equality in Maryland, evidenced in the
court decisions summarized above, illustrates this process.
The most obvious illustration is the trial court's decision to ignore
the reality of sex difference. 104 By treating the mere mention of the
sex of parties to a marriage as facially discriminatory and justifying
strict scrutiny, the court implied that the law could not even take into
consideration the reality that men and women are not
interchangeable. lOS Ironically, this reading would gut any attempt to
protect women in the law because such an effort must explicitly
Id.
Id.
101
Id.
102
William C. Duncan, Same-Sex Couples and "The Exclusive Commitment": Untangling
the Issues and Consequences: Marriage and the Utopian Temptation, 59 RUTGERS L. REv.
265, 272 (2007).
103
Scott J. Anderson, Gay Republicans: GOP on 'wrong side of history,' CNN, Sept. 2,
2008.
104
See Deane, 2006 WL 148145; see also Md. State Bd. Of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn,
270 Md. 496, 503, 312 A.2d 216,220 (1973).
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See Deane, 2006 WL 148145, at *3.
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recognize that there are differences and these differences have import.
If men and women are truly interchangeable what could be wrong with
a club consisting only of the members of one sex? Under the court's
analysis, one could expect no substantive difference in makeup if only
men or only women were involved. This fungibility argument has
been consistently rejected in United States Constitutional law. 106 The
Supreme Court has specifically allowed for differential treatment of
men and women in laws regarding statutory rape. 107 Any law
protecting women from discrimination based on pregnancy or against
violence similarly recognizes this reality. lOS The Court has stated that
"[p]hysical differences between men and women, however, are
enduring: 'The two sexes are not fungible; a community made up
exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community composed of
both. ",109 The non-ideological decision of the Court of Appeals easily
avoided this error.
The trial court also ignored biological differences between men and
women. It argued that the marriage law employing a husband-wife
definition of marriage was analogous to an earlier court decision that
expressed J'reference for a mother raising daughters in assigning child
In making this analogy, however, the court failed to
custody. I I
consider the obvious problem with such a decision-that it would
separate a parent from a child; not that it would separate a female child
from a male parent. The problem in that case was not sex segregation;
it was disrupting a parental relationship on the basis of the sex of one
parent. In other words, it would have been just as problematic if that
earlier court had said the mother received custody of all sons because
mothers do a better job parenting sons than fathers. There would be a
fonn of sex integration in such a decision but the key problemdisadvantaging a parent because of that parent's sex-would not have
been addressed. Similarly, in its exclusive focus on the irrelevant
question of parenting skills, III the trial court elided the much more
salient reality that a child born to a married mother and father will
usually be the child of both, while a child born to a parent in a samesex couple never will be the child of both members of the couple.
106
See, e.g., Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946) (holding that men and
women are not fungible).
107
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
108
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2011); Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
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United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193).
110 See supra notes 34 and 43 and accompanying text.
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The analysis of the trial court also distorted other realities. The
Court of Appeals noted two of these constitutional realities in its
rejection of the sex discrimination analysis and the suspect class
The trial court's curiously
discussion of the court below. Jl2
government-centered analysis of the state's interaction with marriage
is another example of distorted understanding. The court asserted that
Maryland was trying to advance the state's interests related to
procreation through the "prevention of same-sex marriages.,,113 This
is not an accurate statement of the state's posture in regard to
marriage. In retaining the longstanding conception of marriage as the
union of a husband and wife in its law, the court is not preventing
same-sex couples from having relationships, even of calling these
relationships marriages. Instead, the state is choosing to promote an
understanding of marriage that is necessarily child-centered by
retaining a definition that encompasses only those types of
relationships that may result in the birth of children without third party
participation. Prohibiting same-sex couples from making personal
choices and promoting their choice by redefining marriage to include
it are not the only two possibilities open to the state. 114 It may, as it
does, choose to allow a wide realm of personal choice to same-sex
couples while retaining formal recognition of the uniqueness of the
male-female bond.
The trial court's analysis distorted the public interests in marriage.
As noted earlier, the court assumed that the legislature must have
enacted its definition of marriage because it believed opposite-sex
couples make better parents than same-sex couples. I IS Thus, it
described the state interest as promoting a unit "in which the
heterosexual parents are married.,,116 It is instructive to note how
easily the Court of Appeals detennined that the issue was not, contrary
to the trial court's findings, some sort of favoritism among various
sexual arrangements. Rather, as the Court of Appeals noted, the legal
distinction between male-female couples and other arrangements is
based on some deep and "inextricable" realities-specifically, that "it
is that relationship that is capable of producing biological offspring of
both
members
(advances
III
reproductive
technologies
See supra notes 44-53, 63-66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
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notwithstanding).,,1l7 A child born to a marriage of his or her parents
is guaranteed to have a legally enforceable relationship with both
parents. In defining marriage consistent with this reality, the law
encourages the kinds of couples whose relationship can result in the
birth of children. Even though having children may not be the specific
intention of every married couple, they can commit to one another and
their children through their union. It simultaneously encourages the
people who create children to jointly care for them and makes real a
legal, social, and practical tie between the child and his or her own
parents.
Marriage advances the state's procreation-related interest even
when a specific married couple cannot or do not have a child. This
couple can provide a close substitute for a child otherwise deprived of
a relationship with his or her own biological parents and, by their
faithfulness to their marital commitment, they do not create children
with other people who will grow up in a fatherless or motherless
home. Redefining marriage, by contrast, would legally enshrine an
understanding of marriage that necessarily has nothing to do with
children. Certainly same-sex married couples could have children, but
this decision would have no intrinsic link to their marital status. In
other words, redefining marriage makes even more tenuous the
relationship between marriage and children that has already been
stretched by cultural trends like divorce, cohabitation, and unwed
parenting. It would thus make it impossible for marriage law to
channel male-female sexual relations into a child-centered union. In
fact, the state would be legally precluded from doing so because if a
class of spouses are in a type of relationship that always and
everywhere cannot result in children without third party participation,
clearly the legal category of which they are a part cannot be childcentered. In other words, enshrining a definition of marriage that
necessarily has nothing to do with children necessarily follows a legal
redefinition to include same sex couples. The new, adult-centered,
understanding of marriage may provide benefits to the parties to a
marriage, but it cannot and will not provide the basic public goods
marriage has served. If forced to rely only on the trial court's analysis
of the state interests in marriage, these likely costs of redefinition
would never be clear; only the Court of Appeals decision raises them.
Another risk inherent in the redefinition of marriage, but not
disclosed by the triumphalist argument for same-sex marriage, is the
risk that marriage will lose any social meaning and become merely an
117
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individualist arrangement. This is inherent in the adult-centered
understanding of marriage that follows from redefinition. The Court
of Appeals noted that marriage is a "public institution" in which the
state has a valid interest. 118 Again, this point would have been missed
in the more ideological account of the trial court.
Specifically, endorsing a redefinition of marriage would mean
endorsing a purely contractual understanding of marriage, since it
involves no larger social interests, only the interests of the adult
parties. It is true that the adoption of no-fault divorce has moved the
states much closer to this kind of understanding, but same-sex
marriage would largely complete the transition. Same-sex marriage
merges the public and intimate spheres by conferring public
recognition not on the basis of social goods like responsible
procreation but on purely private choices. It makes marriage a
contingent belonging-a linking of two autonomous individuals as an
action of will. The displaced understanding of marriage certainly
involves an element of choice, but the realities of biology, sexual
complementarity, and the dependence and vulnerability that come with
pregnancy make it impossible to speak of much of what is experienced
in marriage between a man and a woman as freely chosen. As F.R.
Bradley noted, "[m]arriage is a contract, a contract to pass out of the
sphere of contract.,,119 The initial choice of marriage creates
obligations and liabilities, as well as joys and opportunities, which are
not properly understood as bargained for. If we continue to embrace a
purely contingent notion of marriage we will see a continued "waning
of belonging" which ignores "the organic correlations between
autonomy and dependence, which lies at the heart of human
existence.,,120 To legally enshrine the concept of contingent belonging
as the sine qua non of marriage is what redefining marriage to center it
entirely on adult choice would do.
As discussed above, inevitability seems often to need a push. In
many states, that shove has come from State Attorneys General who
decline to defend marriage laws so as to prevent courts from grappling
with (or to allow courts so inclined to ignore) the real consequences of
changing the definition of marriage. It can also be supplied by courts
118
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who inappropriately apply subjective legal standards like rationality to
avoid them. If a court labels a practice irrational, what recourse do
citizens have? They can hope that a higher court, as in the case of
Maryland, will correct the mistake, but this is not always possible.
The argument from inevitability seeks purposely to prevent the
possibility of correction of a mistaken analysis of the costs of samesex marriage. Professor Weaver explains that "[i]f you teach a
representation of man which pictures him as nothing more than a cork
bobbing on the surface of forces he cannot control, you may expect
If the drumbeat of
him to default on his responsibilities.,,121
inevitability begins to intimidate opponents of the change from
expressing their opposition, as it is indeed intended to do, one can
expect them to default on their responsibility to safeguard marriage. If
on the other hand, the partisans of same-sex marriage "should admit
that this future" of inevitable marriage redefinition:
is only their subjective feeling which they are determined to
objectify, they [will be] bound to show that it is somehow
better or more deserving of realization than that espoused by
the other side. In this case they will have to abandon any
argument based on our presumptive inability to tum the clock
back. For they are now conceding that there is no order which
will come necessarily with the passage of time; there are only
contemplated and willed orders; we can have one or another,
and our choice must take us back to some standard of values
about which men can differ. 122

v.

CONCLUSION

Proponents of marriage redefinition failed in their first attempt to
impose the inevitable, or what they claim is inevitable, on the state of
Maryland through litigation. As this article is being written, they are
now attempting to do so by using the legislative process. While
unsuccessful this past legislative session, only time will tell if
marriage redefinition proponents will be successful through the
legislature.
A careful application of the law prevented the redefinition of
marriage in the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
That court
appropriately resisted the idea that the state's constitution required a
redefinition of marriage. In doing so, the Court of Appeals resisted the
121
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distorting effect of the argument that same-sex marriage is a basic
human right, the denial of which is everywhere and always a
manifestation of atavistic bigotry. It allowed the consensus of
millennia of human experience to stand because the court was willing
to recognize that this consensus reflected realities of human life, the
denial of which would have consequences.
The legislature is being encouraged to do the opposite-to pretend
that there are no differences between men and women and to accept
that any recognition of these differences and their very real
consequences for children and society would be to derogate a human
right. Members of the legislature are being told that they will be on
the wrong side of history if they do not redefine marriage so as to
include any two persons.
Whatever happens in the legislature, it is helpful that the Maryland
courts have taken steps to clarify the stakes.
Marriage is, as the Court of Appeals noted, a social institution. As
such, to adopt the words Edmund Burke used to describe
constitutional liberties, it is part of an "entailed inheritance derived to
us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity.,,123
In Bleak House, an inheritance was dissipated in litigation. 11 that
novel, the expectations of possible beneficiaries to a will were
disappointed when the costs of the litigation entirely consumed the
estate that was in dispute. The ongoing litigation to redefine marriage
threatens the same result. If the arguments rejected by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland are eventually accepted in the legislature or in
other courts, the social significance of marriage could be extinguished
only to be replaced with an empty le§al construct meant only to ratify
the relationship choices of adults. 12 Such an outcome would also
frustrate the expectations of children that they will be able to grow up
in a world where their rightful inheritance, the opportunity for a
relationship with a mother and father, will be secured.

123 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 119 (penguin Classics
1986)(1790).
124 A change, moreover, likely to frustrate even the expectations of adults, who may feel
their own marriages devalued if they are essentially the legal equivalent of a cell phone
contract (albeit easier to escape from).

